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Abstract
Our recent article, “Are Brazil’s Deforesters Avoiding Detection?” demon-
strated that focusing illegal deforestation enforcement on the subset of forest
monitored by the flagship PRODES system has caused PRODES to capture a
declining share of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Deforesters may be
purposively seeking out forests not monitored for enforcement. Addressing the
problem would help Brazil maintain a cutting-edge forest governance model
worthy of transfer to other nations. Two commentaries questioned our deci-
sion to investigate solely PRODES and not additional government monitoring
systems. We focused on PRODES because it is the most salient deforestation
monitoring system. Other key deforestation monitoring systems are all either
limited to the same monitoring footprint as PRODES, not used for enforce-
ment, or are rarely used for measuring forest loss in the Brazilian Amazon. We
do agree with the commentaries that Brazil’s new satellite monitoring protocol
for greenhouse gas emissions estimation is critical progress of the type we were
advocating in our original article.
Brazil earned praise for reducing the PRODES deforesta-
tion rate in the Amazon Biome from 2008 to 2013. How-
ever, we (Richards, Arima, VanWey, Cohn, & Bhattarai,
2016) demonstrated that two systems monitoring more
of the Amazon’s forests showed no rate reduction in the
period. Two additional studies corroborated our finding,
each finding a similar amount of cryptic-to-PRODES
forest disturbance (Barlow et al., 2016; Tyukavina
et al., 2017). We suspect concentration of enforcement
in forests monitored by PRODES prompted deforesters
to target other forests including areas in the Amazon
unmonitored by PRODES. Thus PRODES is no longer
representative of Amazonian deforestation and enforce-
ment evasion has rendered problematic interpretation
of PRODES trends. Official deforestation rates must
be reasonably certain, coverage reduces certainty, and
some disturbance will always be cryptic to satellites (M.
Bustamante et al., 2016). But advances now permit more
comprehensive deforestation monitoring than PRODES.
Dividing forest disturbance into PRODES-monitored vs
cryptic to PRODES is antiquated.
Recent commentaries (M. M. C. Bustamante et al.,
2017; Raja˜o, Moutinho, & Soares, 2017) found our
methods “useful,” but questioned our focus on PRODES
and not Brazil’s other government satellite forest mon-
itoring systems. We focused on PRODES because of
its unrivaled, but unwarranted salience. The PRODES
deforestation rate: was the basis for Norway’s billion
dollar deforestation performance payment to Brazil;
annually attracts widespread international publicity; and
is oft-used to characterize Brazil as a model for successful
forest governance (Nepstad et al., 2014). The other sys-
tems discussed by both Bustamente et al. and Raja˜o et al.
(Table 1) either are not used for enforcement (and
therefore have no bearing on our enforcement evasion
argument), monitor the same forest subset as PRODES,
or aren’t publicly known. With one exception1, those
products which are used for enforcement monitor no
greater a subset of Amazon forest than PRODES. This
exception was not publicly known before Bustamante
et al. (2017) and thus might not have triggered (much)
evasion.
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Table 1 Monitoring systems highlighted by Raja˜o et al (2017) and Bustamente, et al. (2016), and their respective coverage, availability and usage
Data product Coverage Public Enforcement Deforestation estimates GHG accounting
PRODES Primary forest in Amazon biome X X X
DETER Same extent as PRODES X X
DEGRAD Same extent as PRODES X X
DETER-B Same extent as PRODES X X
System X1 Same extent as PRODES, higher res X
TerraClass Amaz. PRODES deforestation X
TerraClass Cerrado Entire Cerrado biome X
3rd National Com. Brazil X
1It is unclear if, when, how, and to what extent System X may have triggered evasive behavior. Bustamante et al state that the capability to perform
finer resolution monitoring has existed since 2005, but it was ambiguous in their comment when this information began being supplied to enforcement
officials. And even if this communicationwere implemented during our study period, wemight not expect it to have triggered asmuch evasion as PRODES
both because it did not influence all types of enforcement (some enforcement is tied to the official PRODES deforestation rate) and because it had not
been revealed publicly to be an enforcement input until the Bustamante et al. comment.
We do join the commentaries in heralding improve-
ments to the comprehensiveness of forest monitoring for
terrestrial GHG accounting in Brazil. While our article
was being finalized, Brazil revised its plan for accounting
for deforestation emissions. The revised plan extended a
PRODES-like deforestation monitoring approach to other
biomes and over the entire Brazilian Amazon. The offi-
cial results of the new system, however, are not publicly
available, the methods divulged are insufficient for repli-
cability, and estimates are not annual (Ministry of Science
and Technology of Brazil 2016). Thus, the system is of
limited use including for vital functions such as tracking
the annual deforestation rate.
Ending deforestation requires high quality enforce-
ment data combined with independent, rigorous evalu-
ation of governance efficacy. There are many options for
technologically and institutionally strengthening enforce-
ment and evaluation. Our original article suggested that
one such option is to ensure separation between defor-
estation evaluation and enforcement. We therefore hope
that the proposal for the Environment Ministry to hire a
monitoring contractor (Stokstad 2017) does not lead to a
closer relationship between enforcement and evaluation.
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